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On Zalta’s Notion Encoding in Conceivability-Contexts 
 
 
 
 clear-cut distinction is needed between abstract and ordinary objects 
for the sake of clarity of our ontology. Even though we decide that our 
variables uniformly range over individuals, some formal distinction must 
select apart abstract and concrete objects within a unified domain of 
quantification. A fine way of putting the required ontological difference is 
Zalta’s proposal that abstract objects encode their properties while concrete 
ordinary ones exemplify them (Zalta 1988: pp. 15-32). The difference is 
then captured by distinct modes of predication and is notationally rendered 
as: ‘xF’ for x encodes the property F and ‘Fx’ for x exemplifies this same 
property; the position of the variable indicates on which kind of objects it 
ranges. In principle no ordinary object encodes a property and no abstract 
object exemplifies one.1 The extent of this neat distinction in some 
particular intensional contexts is what will be critically discussed here. 
This discussion will hopefully lead to a finer attunement of our intuitive 
understanding of the ways we intentionally relate to all sorts of objects 
with the spelling out of logical features of intensional contexts. 
 
I. The Modal Axiom of Encoding and Its Intuitive Consequences 
 
The intuitions underlying each of the two modes of predication and the 
chosen terminology are clear. There is no other way to identify abstract 
objects but by knowing their properties. Properties had by ordinary objects 
are, generally, less identificatory. Abstract objects encode their properties 
in the sense that the latter form crucial pieces of information in view to be 
able to mentally grasp those very objects, while concrete objects merely 
exemplify properties which they could, in other circumstances, fail to. Or, 
again, abstract objects are such as we define them – that is as we predicate 
something of them – which is not the case for ordinary objects. The 
constructive element in the ontology of abstract objects seems to motivate 
a specific logical behaviour, as expressed by Zalta’s following Modal 
                                                          
1 Which does not exclude relations relating abstract and concrete objects. 
A
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Axiom of Encoding : ‘◊xF → ٱxF’ (Zalta 1997). Properties possibly 
encoded by an abstract object are encoded by the same object in every 
possible world. Concrete objects do not similarly behave in modal 
contexts, unless we wish to say that every possibly exemplified property is 
part of their essence, which would ruin the idea of an object possibly being 
otherwise altogether. It is clear that we do not tend to reject this same 
counterintuitive conclusion in the case of abstract objects. 
 
Let’s note first that there is a possible double reading of the Modal Axiom 
of Encoding. One reading, just indicated, merely states that abstract objects 
essentially possess their properties. What we have here is a static 
characterization of the rigid extension of encoded properties across logical 
space. On the other reading, we pay closer attention to the antecedent of 
the conditional: if it is possible that an abstract object encodes a given 
property, then it encodes it necessarily. If we bear in mind the fact that 
abstract objects depend for their existence on acts of stipulation – as the 
very notion of encoding inclines to think – we can make the antecedent 
reflect this constructive aspect of our intentional relation to abstract 
objects. Every act of stipulation deemed acceptable essentially defines an 
abstract object. What the Modal Axiom of Encoding intuitively means, 
then, is: if we envision the possibility of an abstract object encoding a 
certain property, then we have essentially characterized this abstract object. 
According to this reading, unlike what our sense of alternative makes 
intuitively congenial to ordinary objects, it is vain to think of an abstract 
object as being otherwise than it is, and even otherwise than it could be. 
 
This reading of his axiom is not indicated by Zalta, but it naturally 
correlates a distinctive logical behaviour of abstract objects in intensional 
contexts with the way we intentionally stipulate their existence.2 On this 
reading what the axiom states is that possible encoding is necessary 
encoding. And however we define possible encoding, once we get it and 
the corresponding abstract object, there is no more possibility to make the 
latter otherwise. What is possible encoding? As we have already 
emphasized, the notion of possibility, for an abstract object, involves no 
comparison between possible worlds wherein the concerned abstract 
objects would clothe different guises. So either possible encoding means 
                                                          
2 If the role of the Axiom were simply to express the fixed extensions of encoded 
properties across logical space, ‘xF → ?xF’ would suffice, in the kind of models for 
modal logic, with no actual world designated, which Zalta prefers. 
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that the encoded property is consistent with other properties of the same 
object (internal possibility) or, in a looser way, that the stipulative act 
targeting the abstract object is not empty: it actually targets an abstract 
object encoding a certain property (intentional possibility). Internal 
possibility is an extranuclear property of abstract objects which can exert 
more or less lax constraints over the individuation of abstract objects3. 
Intentional possibility is, similarly, accompanied by degrees of 
representational constraints over the targeted object. It is not a neutral 
matter to define in a precise way what to admit as possible encoding, but 
we more exclusively focus on one common aspect to all putative 
definitions: acts of stipulation or intended encodings (and intuition lends 
them a large amount of freedom), when possible, are creative, in the sense 
that they yield an object, and they give direct access to its essence. 
 
This immediately points to a major intuitive difficulty for the Modal 
Axiom of Encoding. If its constructive reading reflects how we mentally 
individuate and grasp abstract objects and accurately reflects the behaviour 
of abstract objects in intensional contexts, it also egregiously fails to 
account for the way we latch onto the same abstract objects, or at least 
think we can do, across more than one act of stipulative encoding. If each 
possible encoding of a property to an object freshly individuates a new 
denizen of the realm of abstracts, there is no way to express something 
counterfactual about some previously individuated abstract objects that we 
wish to keep in mind. The problem is clearly that with abstract objects 
counteressentiality comes too soon – every act of encoding about an 
intended abstract object shifts the identity of what we are thinking about. 
Creativeness entails systematic shiftiness. However, we can easily imagine 
cases where stipulative encoding would rather not be creative or shifty, like 
when we try to discover some as yet unknown property of a given abstract 
object, or like when we merely add, substract or substitute one of its 
properties. In a sense, even if we change the essence of such an object, we, 
at least so may we think, did not intend to change its intentional identity. A 
given straight line remains self-identical, for us, when we consider it, 
alternatively, in Euclidean and in Lobatchevskian spaces, although it 
comes to encode significantly distinct properties. Barring shiftiness while 
                                                          
3 Talk of extranuclear properties belongs to the neo-Meinongian tradition. See in 
particular Parsons 1980. Extranuclear properties define constraints on first-order or 
nuclear properties, more or less stringent conditions of consistency can be defined. 
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preserving the intuitions of free stipulation and creativeness seems 
sometimes required. 
 
II.  Counteressential Conceivability 
 
A parallel can be drawn with the way we may intend to counterfactually 
negate some essential properties of ordinary objects. In spite of the fact 
that, contrary to abstract objects, essence is only a subset of an ordinary 
objects’s properties, shiftiness and creativeness have been all the same 
pointed out by authors defending the Modal 2-Dimensionalist account of 
conceivability, as Yablo concisely puts it. 
 
Very often one finds a statement E conceivable, when as a matter of fact, 
E-worlds cannot exist. (…) the failures always take a certain form. A 
thinker who (mistakenly) conceives E as possible is correclty registering 
the possibility of something, and mistakenly the possibility of that for the 
possibility of E. (Yablo, 2000: 98). 
 
 Modal 2-Dimensionalists contend that when we try to conceive of water as 
not being H2O, for instance, we conceive nothing about ordinary water 
itself, but perhaps something about another substance in its epistemic 
vicinity. Shiftiness and creativeness are not, then, specific behaviours of 
abstract objects in intensional contexts. They arise, more generally, when 
negations of essential properties of any kind of objects occur. Shiftiness 
and creativeness form two grades of a common phenomenon which 
consists in change of intentional identity. Shiftiness means that the 
intended object of our thoughts has been modified; creativeness that our 
intentional state is not empty and is immediately specified by the 
predicative content of our act of conceiving. Modal 2-Dimensionalists 
accept both shiftiness and creativeness, while a Kripkean approach to 
counteressential conceivability rejects both. A Kripkean would retort to an 
epistemic agent that she has conceived nothing about water and nothing 
about anything else in the vicinity either, when she pretends that water 
could have chemically differed. If she persists in thinking that she actually 
intends to conceive something about ordinary water, then both the Modal 
2-Dimensionalist and the Kripkean, for their different reasons, will 
diagnose serious modal self-delusion. We propose a solution in the 
between. 
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One can reject the diagnosis of modal illusion and tries to make sense of 
the persistent, if not fully justified, feeling by the agent that she intends to 
think something, albeit counteressential, about ordinary water. Two ways 
in view to make sense of this feeling can be suggested. One, which we 
leave undevelopped here, is to hold that, while the agent does not bear in 
mind any possibility concerning ordinary water, she nonetheless seriously 
entertains an impossibility about this very substance, rather than a 
possibility about an epistemically close substance. Another interesting 
elaboration of the agent’s epistemic situation is to say that, although 
ordinary water exemplifies not being H2O in no possible world, it – i.e. 
ordinary water – possibly encodes this same property. As no ordinary 
object encodes any property, according to Zalta’s neat basic ontological 
distinction, we’d better rephrase this suggestion in more cautious terms and 
describe the agent’s intuition by saying that, in such a particular 
conceivability-context, she makes as if ordinary water encode not being 
H2O or, plainly, that she considers the state of affairs of ordinary water not 
being H2O in abstracto. One can also introduce a term of art and 
characterize the particular intensional context at stake as ordinary water 
possibly quasi-encoding one of its counteressential properties. 
 
Now, even if we judge useful to adopt a Modal Axiom of Quasi-Encoding, 
in order to reflect the freedom and creativeness of our counteressential 
stipulations about ordinary objects, we will not be exposed to systematic 
shiftiness, as we were with abstract objects. Whereas it is certainly true that 
quasi-encoded properties always essentially determine some quasi-abstract 
objects or, more precisely, some states of affairs consisting of an ordinary 
object being in a certain counteressential way, we, obviously, do not lose 
track of the original ordinary object through such a stipulative act, nor 
along its iteration. The original object continues to be nominally present in 
the successive descriptions of the intended states of affairs. Moreover 
every property quasi-encoded by an ordinary object is a property which 
does not belong to its essence and, by definition, which is not possessed in 
every possible situation. These features of quasi-encoding explain why, 
whereas we mentally strip an ordinary object of its essential properties, this 
object may remain intentionally self-identical, and how we can feel 
epistemically entitled to think that we continue to think and conceive about 
it what we think and conceive. 
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Quasi-encoding preserves intentional identity of ordinary objects across 
sequences of counteressential predication. From an epistemic point of view 
we do not have to ascribe to the agent any form of radical ignorance of 
what water essentially is while she engages in such sequences. Two 
cognitive tracks can be pursued in parallel: one keeping hold of the 
essential properties of ordinary water and its identity, the other following it 
across counteressential settings. A typical prejudice of the two 
aforementionned approaches to conceivability is to postulate too close 
limitations to an agent’s epistemic capacities. We keep the Kripkean notion 
of rigidity since ‘water’ continues to designate the same substance in every 
conceived situation, and the Modal 2-Dimensionalist import in considering 
that the predicative content or our act of conceiving determines a situation 
and possibly a new object in this situation. 
 
III. Quasi-Encoding and Hypothetical Stipulation 
 
The notion of quasi-encoding might contribute a solution to the problem of 
systematic shiftiness met with abstract objects. When we hypothetize about 
some property possibly encoded by a given abstract object, because we 
ignore whether this object actually encodes this property, it is expedient, in 
order to reflect our current epistemic state, not to immediately entail that 
the intended object essentially possesses the hypothetized property. More 
precisely, it is useful to be able to express the fact that – although we have 
individuated, so to say unwittingly, a new abstract object which, in 
accordance with the Modal Axiom of Encoding, essentially possesses the 
hypothetized property – our attention has not shifted towards this new 
abstract object but holds back on the object we had previously in mind. It 
appears that the way we intentionally proceed with abstract objects 
reciprocates situations of counteressential conceivability involving 
ordinary ones. In those latter cases we direct our attention to an object 
whose essential properties we know and continue to be aware of while we 
negate one of these properties. Reciprocally, in the case of hypothetical 
stipulation, we ignore whether an essential property belongs to an intended 
abstract object. So we individuate a fresh new abstract object of which we 
ignore whether it is identical or not with our intended object. Again, in the 
case of ordinary objects negation of an essential property does not make us 
lose track of the original object, while in the case of abstract object 
predication of an essential property does not necessarily imply that we shift 
our attention to this newly characterized object. 
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There are intentional states, thus, in which we deliberately engage, directed 
towards abstract objects whose behaviour does not fully comply with 
Zalta’s Modal Axiom of Encoding. Even if a given abstract object A 
possibly encodes a certain property F, and then necessarily encodes F, we 
can also consider the epistemic situation in which we wonder whether A 
possibly encodes F or not. In this situation, we wish to refrain either from a 
necessary or essentialist conclusion or from a too hasty identification of A 
with its hypothetical characterization as encoding F. Such acts of 
hypothetical stipulation are better explained in terms of our notion of 
quasi-encoding through which we do not essentially apply F to A. In a 
similar way as for ordinary objects in counteressential contexts, we give a 
name to the object that we have in mind and it remains nominally present 
across sequences of hypothetical stipulations. The difference between the 
two cases is that while we knew by definition that the property quasi-
encoded by the ordinary object was not part of its essence, this fact is 
precisely what we ignore when an abstract object quasi-encodes a property 
in contexts of hypothetical stipulation. Ignorance makes us mentally split 
between two intentional objects as a measure of cautiousness, while 
knowledge produces the same effect in case of ordinary objects. 
 
Our critical point is that the Modal Axiom of Encoding captures logical 
features of encoding in relatively uninteresting intentional contexts, or at 
least in contexts that reflect only partially our actual dealings with abstract 
objects. When we consider possible encoding, as the antecedent of the 
Axiom invites to do, the Modal Axiom of Encoding concludes that we 
have pinpointed an abstract object which is in every situation as it is in this 
specific possible one. As soon as we have attached a property to an abstract 
object, it is true that we have defined it essentially. However this might 
capture a deep truth about the ontological nature of abstract objects, we are 
often led to consider abstract objects in a less static and more creative way, 
namely in contexts of discovery or inquiry, that is in contexts where 
possible encoding is precisely a case in point, still unsolved. In such 
contexts the Modal Axiom of Encoding must be weakened. However, as 
this axiom reflects a deeply entrenched intuition about the way abstract 
objects essentially have their properties, it is preferibly complemented by 
other principles describing the ways objects, both concrete and abstract, 
may hypothetically possess some properties. 
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Complementation of the Modal Axiom by principles of quasi-encoding is 
the most conservative way of preserving the basic distinction between the 
two modes of predication which tell apart abstract from ordinary objects in 
extensional and most intensional contexts. Quasi-encoding only applies in 
those contexts where predication either negates or putatively adds an 
essential property to a given object. As every property of an abstract object 
is essential to it, those contexts are typical of our creative and speculative 
relationship with abstract objects. In contexts where essence is negated or 
hypothetized, modes of predication to ordinary and abstract objects seem 
to collapse in a single one – quasi encoding – and to share modal behaviour 
– non necessity of the predicated property. The difference between abstract 
and ordinary objects in those particular contexts is primarily epistemic: we 
know the essence of an ordinary object in contexts of counteressential 
conceivability while we ignore the essence of an abstract object in contexts 
of hypothetical stipulation. 
 
This finally suggests two far less conservative ways of accounting for the 
limited application of the Modal Axiom of Encoding in conceivability-
contexts. One way is to contend that ordinary and abstract objects differ as 
far as epistemic differences arise in intentional contexts. Contexts of 
counteressential conceivability and hypothetical stipulation, under this 
contention, are paradigmatic, to the extent that a single mode of 
predication applies to both kinds of objects in these contexts while our 
knowledge of their identity may differ. A second way of revising the 
Modal Axiom of Encoding is to loosen up the connections between 
essence and intentional identity. If we lift the constraint exerted by essence 
on identity, we can accept the necessary consequent of the Modal Axiom 
of Encoding without presupposing anything about the identity of the 
agent’s intentional object. This is, to a certain extent, what we have hinted 
at through our main argument, but we have avoided to vindicate the 
complete disconnection between essence and identity, by rather 
postulating, quite natural at our eyes, epistemic capacities to mentally keep 
track of more than one object at the same time. 
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